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INDIAN VIEWS ON THE U.S.S.R. AND ON INDIAN COMMUNISTS

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SUMMARY

The Interim Government of India is undertaking to cultivate friendly relations with the USSR partly to obviate the danger of antagonizing its powerful neighbor and partly because Indians hope to profit from Soviet experience in operating a planned economy in solving India's manifold domestic problems. Cooperation between the two on the international level is based primarily on a common hostility to Great Britain and on their similar positions on such issues as colonialism and racial discrimination. The disruptive activities of the Communist Party in India (CPI), which are deeply resented by provincial Congress Party governments, are a potential although not a current source of embarrassment to the development of friendly Indo-Soviet relations. The Indian press generally holds that the USSR is more friendly than the CPI to the Indian nationalist cause and supports the government's efforts at rapprochement with Russia, giving credence to Soviet attacks on Anglo-American world policy. The show of CPI-Muslim League fraternization in India, based on common dislike of the Congress Party, is lacking in substance. Both Moscow and the Indian Communists oppose the League's emphasis on religious partisanship, its tendency to seek British support for Pakistan, and the efforts of M. A. Jinnah, President of the League, to seek Arab backing in the Near East on the basis of a supposed Hindu or Soviet imperialist menace. The honeymoon between Moscow and New Delhi will probably continue until the Indian Government is obliged to take some direct responsibility for maintaining world peace that involves a clash of interests with the USSR, until Indians learn that their hopes of obtaining tangible assistance from the USSR are illusory or until the USSR is ready to embark on a campaign to win India to Communism.

INTRODUCTION

India's leaders view the Soviet Union from three distinct points of view. The USSR is first of all a near and powerful neighbor with which an independent India must maintain friendly relations despite certain misgivings regarding Soviet intentions. The Soviet Union, in the second place, has set a pattern for rapid modernization, especially in the economic and technological fields, that Indians, impatient of slower methods, would like to emulate. Finally, the USSR, in the Indian view, is the fountainhead of inspiration for a world-wide Communist movement that finds expression in the generally unpopular activities and program of the Communist Party of India (CPI). Contradictory elements are present within the three points of view and much depends on which gains the ascendence in the Indian mind. The first two tend at the moment to draw India and the USSR closer together while the third is a potential cause of friction.

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I. INDIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE USSR AS A POWERFUL NEIGHBOR

A. Acknowledgment of the Importance of the USSR

1. Effects of Proximity. The geographical proximity of the USSR to India's Northwest Frontier coupled with the inadequacy of India's land defenses to resist invasion affords India little choice but to attempt to cultivate friendly and cooperative relations with her neighbor, the Soviet Union. There exist between the two no urgent issues of controversy either diplomatic or economic, and considerations affecting India's internal political and economic progress argue strongly for the development of cordial relations. Pandit Nehru's own paper has repeatedly affirmed that "India is in no position to quarrel with the rest of the world"[1] and will be called upon to undertake many tasks in common with the USSR[2]. Although seeking to cultivate close relations with Russia, he declared that India must pursue an independent foreign policy free from entanglement with existing power groupings. India is greatly concerned to avoid becoming a battlefield in any third World War.[3]

2. Deference paid to the USSR as Compared with Criticism of Anglo-American Actions. As an indirect way of demonstrating that India is a potential if not a real friend of the Soviet Union, Indian newspapers affiliated with virtually all political groups have indulged during the past year in outspoken criticism of Anglo-American policies. The US and the UK became convenient whipping boys whose policies, particularly in the Near and Far East, could be castigated. By contrast, the Indian press, with a few exceptions, displayed great circumspection in referring to Soviet policy.[4] V.K. Krishna Menon, who has on occasion acted as Pandit Nehru's personal envoy, is reported on good authority to have warned Calcutta correspondents in September 1946 to refrain from publishing anti-Soviet propaganda, which would only enable the British to strengthen their hold upon India.[5] Such a policy has been consistently followed by many Congress papers. In similar vein the Muslim League paper, Dawn, has declared that Soviet anxiety for security is natural, and that it is therefore incumbent on the US and UK to remove Russian suspicions about their intentions.[6]

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1. T-274, New Delhi, April 21, 1947, RESTRICTED.
2. Government of India, Information Services, No. 3228, September 10, 1946.
3. Sir Sultan Ahmed, A Treaty Between India and the United Kingdom (New Delhi, 1945), pp. 46-47. The author argues for closer commercial and diplomatic relations with the USSR and even suggests that Britain's twenty-year treaty of friendship with the USSR be considered binding on India as well.
4. The Hindustan Times, November 11, 1946, reminded Britain that the Arabs would not yield to her flattery and remarked that the USSR was clearly out to take advantage of the opportunity in Persia to establish herself in the Middle East, "for good or ill, who can say?"
5. D-1292, Calcutta, December 26, 1946.
6. R-14, New Delhi, January 22, 1947, RESTRICTED.

Soviet portrayal of America as the spearhead of world capitalist-imperialist reaction intent on establishing world dominion is widely reflected in the Indian press. Suspicions planted by British spokesmen regarding the extension of America's power in the world both absolutely and relatively as a result of the war contribute to the credence accorded Russian charges.[1] Indian observers, furthermore, see America backing colonialism in southeastern Asia.[2] A reputable Indian periodical published an article emanating from French leftist sources representing the American proposal for an Atomic Development Authority as part of a plot to achieve world domination.[3] General Marshall's appointment as Secretary of State was depicted in both Communist and nationalist papers in India as marking the repudiation of President Roosevelt's policies in favor of reactionary militarist objectives, which included either support of British imperialism in India or the exploitation of India for American interests.[4] On numerous occasions Indian papers have reproduced verbatim Soviet propaganda handouts.[5]

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1. The Socialist paper Janata declared that General MacArthur was catering to Japanese reactionaries by attempting to convert Japan into a buffer against Red Russia, while the National Call (independent nationalist) argued that the role of maintaining law and order in China belonged to the UN.

2. R-21, New Delhi, February 6, 1947, RESTRICTED. Dawn commented that America had yielded to the USSR almost by default sponsorship of the freedom of colonial peoples, and the National Call noted that tyrannous Holland, France, and Britain were America's friends, whereas the US had found constant cause to quarrel with the "only country which ... has raised its lonely voice in support of the downtrodden and the oppressed."

3. The Modern Review, LXX, No. 4, October, 1946, pp. 251-52. This article quotes a French newspaper to the effect that the Baruch plan contemplates an international cartel with a monopoly of the production of atomic power under the control of three American "trusts", whose aim is "to convert the greatest scientific experiment in modern scientific discoveries into their own private weapon to be used in their struggle for world domination." See also D-3320, Bombay, February 1, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL.

4. Peoples Age, January 19, 1947; National Standard, March 7, 1947. Other papers accused the US of racial exploitation, of buttressing British imperialism, and of intervention masked by platitudes. See R-14, New Delhi, January 22, 1947, RESTRICTED.

5. Bombay Chronicle, November 11, 1946; Hindustan Times, August 2, 1946; R-215, New Delhi, November 20, 1946, RESTRICTED; Commonweal (Leftist) declared: "The giants of jingoism masquerade as the saviours of humanity." The Lahore Tribune referred to the reestablishment of Iranian control in Azerbaijan in the following terms: "Subtle Anglo-American imperialistic intrigues at Teheran have now erased Azerbaijan from the map of Asia." The same paper described China as "tied to the chariot wheels of the United States with dollar chains." See R-7, New Delhi, January 8, 1947, RESTRICTED.

Indian Anglophobia carries over to the US in large measure as partner and supporter of the British. On the Palestine issue American policy has been severely criticized because of Indian sympathy for the Arab point of view. Dawn has often followed Reuter's lead in sparing Britain and attacking the US alone presumably because the Muslims were courting conservative British support for Pakistan.[1] The Indian press has for several years publicized lynchings and other manifestations of racial discrimination in America as well as stories of American gluttony and waste of food.[2]

Even those Indians who eschew irresponsible accusations against Britain and America have been for the most part respectful of the Soviet Union. One conservative Indian writer who was bold enough to describe Soviet postwar behavior as that of a "child who has been inhibited and despised all along and who suddenly finds freedom and confidence to do whatever it pleases," added immediately that Soviet achievements and sacrifices must nevertheless be recognized and that the USSR could no longer be disregarded and flouted. He also observed that Britain could exert no overwhelming moral influence on the USSR to cease her rough-shod diplomacy and bullying tactics in eastern Europe and Iran as long as the Soviet Union could find excuse for her conduct by reference to British activities in Greece, Egypt, and southeastern Asia.[3] An Indian capitalist-nationalist organ observed that the tide throughout the world had turned in favor of Communism and that no clear-cut answer was forthcoming as to whether Soviet intentions included conquest or economic subjugation of other nations. The author believed further, that the world at large looked to America for a lead toward a new order, but observed that the US had not yet demonstrated that it meant business "in the matter of equality of nations and the wiping out of imperialism and exploitation".[4] The Hindu of Madras (Congress) suggested that Britain quit trying to act like a world power and accept the role of spokesman for small nations in the UN voicing the feelings of less powerful nations whose interests are endangered by Great Power ambitions.[5]

As long as no overtly aggressive move is made in India's direction the Indian Government's policy of discreet deference to the Soviet Union will probably continue, supported by the popular emotional preference in India for everything anti-British. Although genuine distrust of Anglo-American intentions may exist in the minds of many Indian spokesmen, the obvious distortion in the presentation of news items prompts the conclusion that many editors think it expedient to curry Soviet favor. As long as

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1. R-215, New Delhi, November 20, 1946, RESTRICTED. Dawn's editorials have denounced American foreign policy as "a satanic form of intervention", which exhibits "an indecent lust for carving out spheres of influence in other peoples countries." Bombay Chronicle, March 18, 1947, denounced American policy toward the Arab world.

2. CIG-B-152, April 16, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL; R-222, New Delhi, December 9, 1946, RESTRICTED.

3. Bahaj Krishan, "Russian Foreign Policy - an Apology," Indian Review 47, No. 6 (June 1946), pp. 305-308.

4. R-14, New Delhi, January 22, 1947, from Indian Spectator.

5. The Hindu, October 19, 1946.

Delhi accepts no direct responsibility for world security, the Government of India can continue to play up to the USSR and also pursue the independent policy of attempting to build up an Asian bloc under her own leadership. To the extent that India's active participation in world affairs increases, differences with the USSR will emerge.

B. The Bases of Current Soviet-Indian Collaboration

1. Diplomatic Rapprochement. The establishment of direct relations between India and the Soviet Union has been retarded by the official Soviet view, echoed by the Communist Party of India (CPI), that the British have no genuine intention of withdrawing from India voluntarily and that the Indian people must therefore unite to throw them out by violent means. The USSR has demanded a clear break, including the unconditional withdrawal of all British forces from India and the selection, on the basis of adult suffrage, of a sovereign Constituent Assembly.

Foreign Minister Molotov publicly criticized the conduct of the Indian delegation at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference for not displaying an independent view, particularly when the Indians voted with Britain and the US on the Danube River question.[1] After the Interim Government was installed in September 1946, the Soviet radio persisted for a time in declaring that by accepting office the Congress Party had in fact joined hands with the British imperialists, leaving the actual power in the hands of the Army and the enemies of the people.[2] It further said that the Interim Government merely echoed Auchinleck's army policy and without mass support would be powerless to carry out an independent policy.[3]

Before the meeting of the UN General Assembly in November 1946, however, Molotov took cognizance of Pandit Nehru's resolve to follow an independent foreign policy, and expressed the hope that the Indian Government might demonstrate a larger measure of freedom from British control than had heretofore been the case.[4] In his first address before the General Assembly Molotov demanded that India as a member of the UN be accorded sovereign equality with Britain.[5] The Soviet Government made clear, in other words, that the development of cordial relations with India depended in large measure on a demonstration by India of complete independence of British direction of its foreign policy.

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1. All-India Radio, Analysis of Foreign Broadcasts, No. 258, October 16-22, 1946.
2. T-1028, New Delhi, October 11, 1946, CONFIDENTIAL; Soviet broadcasts, August 8 to October 8, 1946.
3. People's Age, October 20, 1946, quoting from Izvestia.
4. All-India Radio, Analysis of Foreign Broadcasts, No. 258, October 16-22, 1946.
5. Roundup of Indian Press Comments, No. 88, 1946, Nov. 1-5, 1946, pp. 243-44.

Cooperation between the Indian and Soviet delegations during the sessions of the General Assembly was facilitated by the emergence of colonial and racial issues on which India and the USSR were in complete agreement. Particularly noteworthy was Soviet support of India's complaint with respect to racial discrimination against Indians in the Union of South Africa. On this issue the Indian press subsequently contrasted Russian sympathy with the "frigid indifference" of the Anglo-Saxon bloc.[1] The two delegations also voted in agreement in criticizing trusteeship proposals, in advocating the placing of all non-self-governing territories under the administration of the UN, in favoring a proposal to organize regional conferences of non-self-governing peoples, in advocating vigorous rejection of the Union of South Africa's bid to annex South West Africa, in refusing Portuguese admission to the UN, and in demanding that the Assembly reconsider its refusal to accept as members Albania and Outer Mongolia, sponsored by the Soviet Union.[2] Both the Indian delegation and the Indian press supported the USSR's proposals for disarmament and for removal of foreign troops from non-enemy states, and its opposition to the fortification of western Samoa by New Zealand.[3] Soviet news agencies in March 1947 gave considerable prominence to letters of thanks from Pandit Nehru to Molotov and to the Foreign Minister of the Byelorussian SSR for supporting the Indian delegation at the UN.[4]

India's efforts to establish formal diplomatic relations with the USSR have met with qualified success. That Moscow was not ready to make the step in September 1946 was indicated by a complaint in the New Times of Moscow that coarsely fabricated slanderous attacks had appeared in the Indian press about the possible danger of interference by the USSR in the internal affairs of India.[5] During the last phase of the Paris Conference (October

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1. R-230, New Delhi, December 30, 1946, RESTRICTED, citing Janata, Hindustan Times and National Call. The Hindustan Times pointed out, on the other hand, that at least ten European nations voted with India, whereas the US and UK did not defend racial discrimination but desired merely to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice.

2. DRE Information Note No. 20, December 11, 1946, UNCLASSIFIED; All-India Radio, Analysis of Foreign Broadcasts, No. 261, November 12, 1946.

3. T-855, New York, November 26, 1946, UNCLASSIFIED; New York Times, December 2, 1946. A Soviet broadcast from Moscow on December 30, 1946 acclaimed "the constructive contribution to the work of the United Nations made by the Indian delegation with its consistently democratic stand." Hindu, January 2, 1947.

4. A-311, Moscow, March 12, 1947, UNCLASSIFIED; A-322, Moscow, March 18, 1947, UNCLASSIFIED. Indian deference to Soviet wishes throughout the sessions of the Assembly contributed to the erroneous conclusion that Communists were also influential in India itself. The Indian delegates felt obliged to deny the existence of any secret understanding with the Soviet delegation. D-878, New Delhi, December 16, 1946, UNCLASSIFIED.

5. The Hindu, September 17, 1946.

1946), however, Pandit Nehru's personal diplomatic representative, V. K. Krishna Menon, conferred about the matter with Molotov with encouraging results. Informal conversations on the subject were continued during the course of the General Assembly meeting in New York and exchange of correspondence on the subject took place over a period of months.[1]

It was finally announced in both capitals on April 13, 1947, that the respective governments had decided to exchange diplomatic missions at the embassy level as a means of maintaining and strengthening friendly relations.[2] The Hindustan Times interpreted the announcement as a clear indication that Russia was no longer suspicious of Britain's promise to quit India by June 1948, and hoped that the new relationship would permit the freer exchange of information and enable Indians to study Russian scientific, agricultural, and industrial methods with a view to the application of Russian experience to Indian economic problems.[3] A New Times article in replying acknowledged that India was moving toward an independent policy, but added that the colossal task of emancipating India was far from completed. Colonial controls still bound India hand and foot, the New Times continued, impeding its economic development, deliberately fomenting internal conflict, and hampering the adoption of an independent foreign policy. The article expressed satisfaction, however, that British and Indian enemies of the USSR had been unable to prevent the establishment of diplomatic relations.[4] In conformity with the New Times' interpretation is the unconfirmed report that the Soviet authorities agreed, in fact, only to exchange official observers, after it was learned that the Indian Ambassador's credentials would be issued by the King-Emperor.

2. Cultural Relations. Prominent Congress Party leaders in 1941-42 were instrumental in organizing the "Society of Friends of the USSR" as a gesture of sympathy for the USSR in the war and as a further means of extracting political concessions from Britain. Although the objectives of the Society were nationalist rather than Communist from the outset the move suggested a Pro-Soviet tendency which has continued in the growth of cultural relations with the Soviet Union. The Society has recently taken a leading part in welcoming Soviet visitors to India and in advertising the social and cultural achievements of the USSR.[5] The Society of the Friends of the Soviet Union staged an impressive poster display at the Town Hall in New Delhi in February 1947, presenting in effective fashion the solicitude of the Soviet Government for the welfare of its people from infant care to adult training.[6]

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1. T-1350, Moscow, April 14, 1947, RESTRICTED.
2. FBIB, Daily Report, April 14, 1947. The press announcement signified India's intention of sending an economic mission to the USSR and its hope that Indian press correspondents could be accorded privileges in Moscow and other news centers. Hindustan Times, April 14, 1947.
3. Hindustan Times, editorial, April 15, 1947.
4. FBIB, Daily Report, April 30, 1947; Hindustan Times, April 23, 1947.
5. FBIB, Daily Report, April 21, 1947.
6. D-978, New Delhi, March 3, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL

Since the beginning of 1947 two Soviet delegations have attended international meetings held in India. Four Communists -- a Russian, a Dane, a Czech, and a Yugoslav -- participated in an International Youth Commission representing the World Federation of Democratic Youth. The Commission visited Calcutta, Lucknow, and Delhi, and was received by such celebrities as Pandit Nehru, Mrs. Pandit, and Maulana Azad.[1] Lavish attention was paid to the visit of four Soviet scientists who attended the sessions of the All-India Scientific Conference held in January and February. While in Delhi the Soviet scientists were the personal guests of Pandit Nehru and his sister, Mrs. Pandit, and two of them were accorded honorary degrees by the University of Delhi. Following the conference they toured India giving lectures at the Universities of Benares, Hyderabad, and Bombay on various aspects of cultural, educational, and scientific developments in the Asiatic republics of the USSR. Although reports from Delhi suggest that some Indian leaders were not favorably impressed with the Russian scientists, their visit was heralded in the press of both India and Russia as symbolizing a new era in cultural relations between the two countries.[2]

A delegation of seventeen delegates representing six of the Asiatic Soviet Republics participated in the Inter-Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi from March 23 to April 3. The Moscow radio commented on the enthusiasm with which Pandit Nehru greeted the Soviet delegates.[3] The Soviet delegates were indeed treated with great deference; but they refused to reply to direct questions as to how Soviet experience could indicate a solution of specific Asiatic problems and on the whole made a bad impression. The members were primarily interested in publicizing the achievements and the power of the Soviet Union. Following the conference this Soviet delegation also toured India.[4]

Economic relations between India and the USSR may be extended in the near future by the dispatch of an Indian economic mission to Russia to study the operation of the Five-Year Plan.[5] The chief of the Soviet Foreign Division for Agriculture has also indicated a desire to send a mission to India to study agrarian problems.[6] For several years a Soviet trading agency consisting of more than a score of Soviet researchers has been working in Calcutta presumably studying economic questions. They are not interested in cultural exchange, however, and have established no known connection with any Indian Communist groups. The eventual establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries will no doubt make possible increased

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1. People's Age, February 9 and March 9, 1947; FBIB, Daily Report, February 14, 1947.
2. FBIB, Daily Report, January 31, 1947; CIG-3891, February 10, 1947, SECRET.
3. OIR-4299.09, Weekly Analysis and Summary of Soviet Broadcasts, March 29-April 4, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL. The tour included Allahabad, Calcutta, Madras, Hyderabad, Bombay, and Karachi.
4. Virginia Thompson's Notes; FBIB, Daily Report, April 10, 1947.
5. FBIB, Daily Report, April 14, 1947.
6. T-399, Moscow, February 14, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL.

economic and cultural interchange.[1]

3. Community of Views between India and the USSR

a. Common hostility to Britain. The principal factor contributing to Indo-Soviet cooperation is the common hostility that the leaders of both countries feel toward Great Britain. Feeling on the part of Indians that their interests are more closely allied with the USSR than with the Western democracies stems as a rule from emotional rather than logical considerations.[2] Soviet and Communist accusations that British imperialism is involved in nefarious practices in the Near East for example,[3] are welcomed because Indians are predisposed to believe them. Indian bitterness toward Britain has been lessened in some quarters as a result of the current British policy of withdrawal, but Soviet and local Communist attacks on Britain's good faith tend to aggravate ill-feeling. The USSR seeks to weaken the British position throughout southern Asia, while many Indians realize that British and American opposition to the USSR's southward pressure constitutes their own first line of defense. Thus far these varying strategic objectives have not been clearly differentiated.

b. Colonialism. Indian opinion and Soviet policy are also in agreement in their opposition to colonialism, although again the reasons are not the same. Indian opposition stems from experience as a subject people and from the fact that India conceives that its security and influence will grow within its part of the world in direct proportion to the decline of colonial power. The USSR, in addition to its interest in enhancement of power both relatively and absolutely, sees in colonialism one of the last props supporting capitalism in the metropolitan countries, as colonies afford the markets and the opportunities for investment necessary to keep the system operating. As long as colonial powers profit from the exploitation of subject peoples, runs the Marxian argument, a thoroughgoing class revolution in metropolitan countries is impossible because workers also profit to some degree from the exploitive system. Liberation of subject peoples as a result of local agrarian revolution thus becomes an integral part of the international working-class revolution.[4]

The destruction of capitalism in the metropolitan states concerns the Indians little if at all. India wants to free southeast Asia from European control, prevent the extension of white predominance in East Africa, protect the rights of overseas Indians resident in British and Dutch colonies and dominions and forestall

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1. D-1482, Calcutta, March 21, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL. Diesel oil accounted for some 65 percent of India's $600,000 worth of imports from USSR in 1945-46; India exported to the USSR $920,000 worth of jute and some $5.7 millions of metals, vegetable oils and raw silk, plus other merchandise trans-shipped from non-Indian sources.
2. D-3320, Bombay, February 1, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL.
3. T-110, New Delhi, February 14, 1947, SECRET.
4. D-4173, London, March 7, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL, enclosure No. 2.

America's presumed intention to dominate the Far East. Indian and Soviet spokesmen agree in advocating the application of liberalized trusteeship agreements to cover all colonial possessions, an agreement growing in part out of their present lack of responsibility for administering colonial areas.

Soviet propaganda persistently brackets capitalism with imperialism, attempting thereby to discredit the US along with Britain. Postwar America is represented to India as having fallen completely under the domination of a reactionary militarist capitalism bent on world domination thereby reducing Britain to little more than a European outpost of the US.[1]

c. The racial discrimination issue. Russia has established within India the reputation of being the only major power which recognizes no color bar or racial differences.[2] The charge that racial discrimination is being practiced in British territories and in America is exploited to drive a wedge between the colored races of Asia and Africa and the Anglo-American world bloc. India's hypersensitive concern over racial matters is couched in idealistic terms, but is rooted in her resentment at having suffered white domination for two centuries.

Although Indian delegations to future sessions of the UN may not take a line as closely parallel to the Soviet Union's as during the November 1946 meeting, Indian and Soviet hostility to Britain, to colonialism, and to racial discrimination will serve to bring the two delegations together on many issues.[3] India will probably elect to hold aloof from many controversial problems and give advice from the sidelines, letting others do the quarreling. Under these circumstances the UN affords a framework within which India and the Soviet Union can cooperate on the international level to the considerable embarrassment of the Western democracies.

d. Indications of Soviet friendliness. Since October 1946 the Moscow radio has been careful to encourage the friendship of Indian governmental authorities. It boasts that the USSR discarded backwardness and poverty in thirty short years to become a mighty and progressive socialist state - an example which India might well follow. It attributes communal strife not to real differences between Indians but to the deliberate machinations of British provocateurs. When agrarian and working-class rioters in north India

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1. People's Age, November 17, 1946, March 2, 1947; Dawn, March 28, 1947. Moscow also suggests hopefully that competition for markets will eventually drive a wedge between the UK and the US, and repeats the Marxian dogma that the capitalist system will sooner or later suffer an economic debacle.

2. Radhakamal Mukherjee, "The Peopling of the Open Spaces," India and World Affairs, vol. I, No. 3, pp. 185-200.

3. In the May 1947 sessions of the General Assembly Indian delegates took a more independent line relating to India's active participation in the Palestine inquiry, but they went out of their way to support the USSR on certain points.

(stirred up by Communist agitators) were being suppressed, Moscow commented objectively only that "the police at Cawnpore had to open fire."[1] Soviet concern was more in evidence when the Communist Party offices throughout India were repeatedly raided by the police, but even here the Soviet authorities interpreted the action as a British-inspired trick to embarrass Pandit Nehru's Interim Government.[2] The People's Age on this occasion failed to anticipate Moscow's ingenious explanation and attacked both the Central and the Provincial governments for allowing the raid.[3] The USSR professed interest in India's age-old culture and admiration for Indian poets, scholars, artists, and craftsmen.[4]

C. Possible Indian Disagreement with the USSR

1. The problem of India's defense. For a number of years to come India's defense needs will require British assistance in maintaining an effective army as well as in providing essential naval and air support. Indian students visualize their country as an essential factor in a security system centering in Anglo-American control of the Indian Ocean, where India is particularly vulnerable, whereas it would be peripheral to any land system that the USSR might establish.[5] The possibility of India realizing its aim of heading an independent Asian bloc is remote. Although India dare not ally itself openly with the maritime powers, it will endeavor to ensure that the Anglo-American bloc will come to its aid if imperilled by Soviet aggression in the Persian-Gulf area.[6] The able Indian editor of the Eastern Economist has declared on the basis of the policy the US has pursued in China that even if India should fall apart during the preparation of a constitution neither Britain nor America could afford to allow India to be attacked from outside. India, he added, must depend on the UN until it can become strong.[7] In June 1947 the Indian army was in the neighborhood of 700,000, but appropriations for defense in India's 1947-48 budget envisage reduction of the army to only 200,000 men about equal to its prewar strength of 180,000. The present Interim Government, conscious of India's weakness and determined to hold to a minimum

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1. All-India Radio, Analysis of Foreign Broadcasts, No. 270, January 8-14, 1947.
2. Ibid., No. 271, January 15-21, 1947.
3. People's Age, January 19 and 28, 1947.
4. Ibid., Nos. 273-274, January 29 to February 11, 1947.
5. The Indian press in July 1946 objected to the sending of British-Indian troops to Basra on the ground that it would only invite Soviet forces to enter Azerbaijan and thus threaten to involve India in a big-power quarrel. Indian newspapers had very little to say regarding the Azerbaijan incident in 1946. D-3031, Bombay, August 9, 1946, RESTRICTED; Dawn, August 7, 1946; National Herald, August 7, 1946; Hindustan Times, August 5, 1946.
6. FBIB, Daily, May 24, 1947. Rajagopalachari, Minister of Industry, declared that the supposed Russian danger did not exist for India, but that India would not hesitate to call on the UK and the US if Russian policy were aggressive, or on the USSR for aid if another nation threatened India.
7. MIS R-800-46, New Delhi, December 20, 1945, CONFIDENTIAL.

India's commitments in the power contest for peace and security, has apparently decided to risk the assumption that the USSR harbors no immediately hostile intent.[1]

The possibility of divergence in Indian and Soviet strategic policies appears in the Interim Government's refusal to accede to Moscow's advocacy of immediate withdrawal of all British troops from India and the recall of Indian troops serving abroad under British command.[2] Soviet critics point to evidence that the British army intends to remain in the Northwest Frontier area for some time as proof that Britain does not intend to grant freedom to India, ignoring the possibility that such arrangements might be continued with India's consent. With the exception of the Communist paper People's Age there is a general lack of Indian press criticism regarding General Auchinleck's Indianization program within the Army. This program will require more than a full decade for its completion. The Indian Government has acquiesced in the retention of Indian troops under British command in Iraq, Burma, Malaya, and in other posts under the British Southeast Asia Command. The Indian need for continued British assistance in matters relating to India's security constitutes the weakest point in Indo-Soviet relations, and one which cordial words and diplomatic gestures will not strengthen.

2. Evidences of Indian Opposition to Soviet Policies. Conservative political and business circles in India are distrustful of the USSR's expansionist designs and are also opposed to Soviet world policies. For example in a speech on September 1946, Homi P. Mody, a prominent citizen of Bombay, declared that in view of the expansionist tendencies of Soviet policies the idea of a world commonwealth might have to be abandoned in favor of a determined effort to consolidate the positions of democratic nations to create their own world order of political liberty and economic security in opposition to the threat of Communism.[3]

Soviet-Indian divergence in the international sphere is also indicated in relation to the problem of atomic energy control. Dawn has severely criticized the Soviet Union for refusing to accept

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1. The Bombay Chronicle for December 22, 1946 remarked: "The essential thing at the moment is to work the UNO for all it is worth and not make fresh international arrangements against the event of its failure." An article by Lord Strabolgi in the Hindustan Times, April 13, 1947, affirmed that there was no evidence that the USSR had military designs on India or that a Communist menace existed. The author declared: "The simple truth is that there is no Russian threat to India," that Russian Communists were not imperialists, and that an independent India was not regarded as a threat to Soviet security in Asia.

2. OIR-4299.11, Weekly Analysis and Summary of Soviet Broadcasts, April 12-18, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL. Soviet broadcasts cited Sarat Bose's demand for recall of Indian troops from Burma.

3. D-3109, Bombay, September 11, 1946, RESTRICTED; Amrita Bazar Patrika, September 9, 1946.

effective international control while Janata, the Congress-Socialist paper, has pointed out that the essential reason for Soviet rejection of the Baruch plan is the unwillingness of the USSR to disclose its own secrets. Another leftist paper (National Front, Cawnpore) has declared in the same vein that the willingness of the US to sacrifice its primacy in the atomic energy field on condition that the world could be safeguarded against the hazards of violation and evasion of controls was the most hopeful aspect of the entire world situation.[1] The Pioneer of Lucknow declared that the American atomic control plan was the only practicable method of international regulation yet devised, pointing out that where America "asks nothing she is not willing to give," Russian "relapse into her bearish, noncooperative attitude" amounted to sabotaging all control.[2]

The Indian press has accorded mixed response to President Truman's message regarding aid to Greece and Turkey. The predominant tone of leading newspapers was one of concern for the preservation of peace,[3] but interspersed among anti-American charges of imperialism, fascism and reaction, and the desire to capture world markets were several neutral and anti-Soviet observations.[4] The Free Press Journal (normally anti-American) said cautiously that India had not yet made up her mind where her sympathies would fall in case a conflict developed between the US and the USSR.[5] Dawn's editors, at first critical of American intervention in Greece,[6] eventually discovered that they were in hearty agreement with President Truman's policy, provided the US refrained from exploiting Greece. The same paper, along with the Hindustan Times and the Bombay Chronicle, welcomed aid to Turkey and criticized Henry Wallace's statements as alarmist, impractical, and smacking of appeasement of Russia. Wallace was widely acclaimed elsewhere in the Indian press.[7] The National Herald (Nehru) disliked the American pattern of intervention but expressed assurance that

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1. "Review of Indian Press for January 1-15, 1947," as quoted in R-14, New Delhi, January 22, 1947, RESTRICTED.
2. R-7, New Delhi, January 8, 1947, RESTRICTED.
3. The reaction of South India papers has been almost uniformly hostile although none went quite as far as the People's Age, which decried the enslavement of Greece by US big business and insisted that it was an easy jump from US domination of the eastern Mediterranean to the enslavement of India. See People's Age, April 6, 1947; Free Press (Congress) and Mysindra (Leftist Congress); D-768, Madras, March 28, 1947, RESTRICTED.
4. Dawn, Pioneer (Lucknow), Telegraph (Cawnpore), Hindustan Times (Delhi), and Bombay Chronicle.
5. D-41, Bombay, March 14, 1947, RESTRICTED.
6. Dawn, March 19, 1947.
7. T-272, New Delhi, April 19, 1947, RESTRICTED. Dawn and the Hindustan Times had accorded unqualified praise for Wallace's statements in October 1946. See R-215, New Delhi, November 20, 1946, RESTRICTED; D-41, Bombay, March 14, 1947, RESTRICTED.

America's impelling motive was not to permit the USSR to fill the vacuum created by the liquidation of the British Empire.[1]

The Telegraph (nationalist) of Cawnpore rejected as mischievous nonsense the Communist talk at London about Anglo-American imperialism, observed that Communists everywhere were the agents of the USSR, and declared that political democracy as commonly understood was conspicuous by its absence under the Soviet Union's dictatorship of the proletariat.[2] The Hindustan Times (Congress) editorially praised President Truman's analysis of free American political institutions as opposed to a Communist regime of imposed minority rule through terror, control of press and radio, and fixed elections, and characterized the German policy set forth by Secretary Marshall at the Moscow Conference as "clear and farsighted" in comparison with the "confused and inconsistent" policy of the USSR.[3] The following forthright utterance by the Pioneer of Lucknow (Congress and anti-Communist) merits verbatim citation:

> "[The President's] ringing denunciation of the Soviet expansionist policy [was] couched in language which Russia understands and respects. . . . The successful practice of diplomacy calls for firmness and a sense of timing, both of which are in evidence in full measure in the U.S. President's outspoken address. . . . This is not jingoism but plain common sense. . . . America has carefully scrutinized her own interests before coming out openly on the side of Turkey and Greece and administering a stern warning to the Soviet. . . . Russia wants everything everywhere in the interest of her security and to make the world safe for communism. It is not possible to strike a lasting bargain with Russia except on her own terms. What the liberal powers can do to keep her in leash is to maintain united vigilance and strength and to tell Russia firmly, as Truman has done, 'so far and no farther.' This may mean uneasy peace, but the alternative is surrender, for no arguments can shake the rigid Russian faith in her own dogma."[4]

This appearance in the Indian press of outspoken criticism of Soviet foreign policy and the Soviet political system, even though the majority of the papers continue to publish clichés about Anglo-American reactionary imperialism, constitutes a significant break with the pro-Soviet press policy heretofore pursued and suggests that still greater change may eventually develop.

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1. National Herald, March 18, 1947.
2. R-62, New Delhi, March 28, 1947, RESTRICTED.
3. Hindustan Times, April 8, 1947.
4. R-62, New Delhi, March 28, 1947, RESTRICTED.

II. THE USSR AS INDIA'S PATTERN FOR RAPID MODERNIZATION

A. Indian Admiration for Soviet Achievement

Indians believe they have much to learn from the USSR in the application of modern scientific techniques to the realization of economic and social ends.[1] The problems that Russia faced a quarter of a century ago are considered roughly similar to those with which India is now obliged to deal -- a backward peasantry, retarded industrialization, and serious barriers to social unity. Indians are convinced that rapid economic progress is possible only through the instrumentality of a carefully managed economy.[2] The following statement from the Hindustan Times (a Birla publication) reflects the views of a conservative Indian capitalist:

> "One of the most important and urgent postwar problems of India is to establish and develop various forms of contact with Soviet Russia. Not only will the USSR be an immensely powerful country but also its economic and social programmes will have special value to India. It will be impossible for this country to liquidate its backwardness by following the slow development of Britain or the USA. We should like to avoid a violent revolution as far as possible and our plans may have to differ from those of Russia as a consequence. But the wonderful progress which Russia has been able to achieve during the last twenty years is not chiefly attributable to the system of proletarian dictatorship resulting from the Bolshevist revolution. It is mainly due to the enormous and almost unlimited encouragement given to science as the instrument of economic and social reconstruction.... While there may be doubts about the possibilities of large scale collectivization a careful study of the Russian achievements will enable our scientists and economists to devise forms suitable to India.... Development of contact on the scientific and cultural levels is also necessary in order to prevent the growth of undesirable prejudices among our people such as those which poisoned the relations of Britain and the USA with Soviet Russian before the war. If the Indian Communist Party were to become the sole interpreter of Russia to India, Russophobia may develop among considerable sections of the Indian people. It is necessary that contacts should be established in those spheres which will counteract this tendency." [3]

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1. From the National Herald of Lucknow (official Congress): "There is no country on which we can look with greater comfort than the USSR. Ours may be a philosophy greater than Marxism but the Russia of today has achieved much that we are only looking forward to."

2. Modern Review, vol. LXXX, No. 6, December, 1946. See the presidential address of President Acharya Kripalani at the 54th session of the Indian Congress Party, November 1946.

3. Hindustan Times, July 3, 1945.

More positive sympathy for the Soviet system comes from India's industrial workers who consider the USSR the champion of the world's laboring classes, from revolutionaries who doubt the effectiveness of Gandhi's non-violent methods, and from student radicals who insist that caste and other barriers to India's progress can be destroyed only as a result of a violent revolutionary break with India's past.

Pandit Nehru in particular is committed to socialist policies and entertains great admiration for Soviet achievements, while Congress Party objectives in the field of economic and social reform owe much to Soviet example.[1] In his address on the occasion of the opening of the recent sessions of the Indian Science Congress, Pandit Nehru declared that India desired planned economic development with social objectives and would endeavor to make the population as a whole scientifically minded by affording maximum opportunity for scientific training. At a reception given in honor of the Soviet delegation during the course of the science meeting he indicated again that India was keenly interested in the USSR because of the astonishing speed with which Soviet scientists had changed the face of their country in the short period of a quarter of a century. He added that India, facing similar tasks, wanted to learn from the Soviet Union, and expressed the hope that diplomatic representatives could be exchanged soon as a means of promoting closer contacts covering many fields of beneficial activity.[2]

Soviet news agencies have acknowledged India's intense interest with obvious gratification. The New Times of March 21 noted the enthusiastic applause that had greeted Pandit Nehru's statement at the reception expressing India's willingness to learn from the USSR and also the hearty reception given public lectures of the touring Soviet scientists on cultural, educational, and scientific progress in the Soviet Union.[3]

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1. OIR-2681, August 1945, UNCLASSIFIED, pp. 23-26.

2. FBIS Daily, January 8, 31, 1947. Nehru's newspaper, the National Herald in April 1947 (R-97, New Delhi, May 12, 1947, RESTRICTED), contained the following statement: "The fear of the pluto-democratic patterns of Britain and America is a genuine fear in this country. The outdated Indian social and economic system has to learn more from Soviet practice than from the elegant deception of Mayfair and Wall Street. There is therefore much desire to study the great unending Russian experiment which has brought about the greatest amount of happiness to such a great mass of people....The sooner the anti-Soviet reactionaries realize the abiding interest which the Indian people are bound to take in this the greatest social experiment in history, the better it would be for them."

3. T-1033, Moscow, March 26, 1947, UNCLASSIFIED; A-156, Moscow, February 7, 1947, UNCLASSIFIED, citing an article in Izvestia; People's Age, (December 29, 1946) repeatedly emphasized that the results of Soviet science are made accessible to the working people. India's representative on ECOSOC in June 1947 urged that the Soviet Asiatic republics be represented on the Economic Development Subcommittee because of the value of their experience to other under-developed countries; T-531, New York, June 3, 1947, RESTRICTED.

B. Advertisement of Soviet Accomplishments

Moscow broadcasts and Communist propaganda in India follow an identical pattern in contrasting the advantages of planned Soviet economy with the social waste, uncertainty, and unemployment of a haphazard capitalist economy. Successive issues of People's Age catalogued the prewar social and economic achievements of the USSR and outlined in detail the objectives of the new Five-Year Plan. The smooth operation of the plan was attributed to the absence of antagonistic bourgeois elements in Soviet society. The Moscow radio compared the planned and orderly reconversion of the USSR to peaceful production, under which the profits of labor were not appropriated by capitalists, to the inevitable oscillation from boom to crisis and unemployment under capitalism.[1] In celebrating the twenty-ninth anniversary of the USSR, the People's Age stressed the contributions of the Soviet revolution to the peoples of Central Asia, including the extension of medical training without racial discrimination. Soviet broadcasts to India stressing economic progress in Eastern Europe on a "democratic" basis[2] were matched in the People's Age by detailed articles describing the "democratic" regimes of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia where, according to the writer, the people are avidly appropriating valuable features from the Soviet system and cooperating enthusiastically in establishing their own livelihood.[3]

There is abundant evidence that Indians are attracted by the hope of finding a short cut to Utopia in the Soviet experiment, even though little opportunity has been afforded them thus far to obtain the desired information or to make any first-hand assessment of Soviet achievements. The Soviet delegates to the Inter-Asian Relations Conference were most uncommunicative, and Moscow has indicated no willingness to permit Indian investigators to enter the USSR. The Indian Government plans to attach to the prospective Indian Embassy at Moscow an eminent scientist to act as observer and as liaison with Soviet scientific groups. If full access to pertinent information were permitted an Indian observer, achievement claims could be compared with actual performance and an estimate of the total cost (economic, social, and political) of the Soviet system might be determined. It appears, however, that to Moscow Communism is an ideology to be accepted in toto and not a bargain counter from which shoppers can pick and choose. The USSR may be obliged eventually, however, to reciprocate privileges accorded the wartime Soviet Trade Agency still working in Calcutta, presumably on problems relating to procurement of Soviet requirements of jute products, minerals, and manufactured goods,[4] by permitting a similar Indian agency to be sent to Moscow.

Considerable Indian resistance to Communist ideology as such may be assumed. Atheistic materialism has no intrinsic appeal to Indians; revolutionary violence advocated by the CPI runs counter to Gandhi's teachings; the denial of property ownership to a land-hungry peasantry

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1. People's Age, December 15, 22, 1946; All-India Radio Monitoring Office, Analysis of Foreign Broadcasts, No. 266, December 11-17, 1946.
2. T-110, New Delhi, February 14, 1947, SECRET.
3. People's Age, November 23, 24, December 8, 1946, and March 9, 1947.
4. R-219A, New Delhi, December 1, 1946, UNCLASSIFIED.

would arouse no enthusiasm. Furthermore, under British rule Indians have enjoyed a large measure of free press and free speech along with parliamentary institutions which they will want to maintain and develop. Even the extreme leftist elements of the Congress Party do not want to see Communist ideology strengthened in the country.[1] Indian Socialists deny that the Soviet system with its acknowledged threat to individual freedom and human rights can be regarded as the only form that a planned economy must take. They insist that such dangers can be avoided by utilizing democratic techniques.[2] The People's Age in reply found it difficult to express in adequate terms its scorn of such renegade Socialists "who call themselves Left, who claim to base themselves on scientific Socialism, with a clear understanding of the character of Imperialism."[3]

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1. Free-Press Journal, March 15, 1947, by Jai Prakash Narain.
2. Statement by Narendra Deva before the Cawnpore Conference, March 1, 1947, from the Hindustan Times, March 2, 1947.
3. Peoples Age, March 2, 1947.

III. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA AS A FACTOR IN SOVIET-INDIAN RELATIONS

A. Historic Position of the Communist Party of India (CPI) [1]

1. The Communist Program of Action in India. According to Lenin's formula of 1920 the liberation of colonial peoples could only be accomplished by Communist-inspired agrarian revolutions coinciding with working-class uprisings in the mother countries. Communism alone could promise subject peoples full racial equality and the right of secession from the metropolitan state. Entanglements with bourgeois democratic elements in the colonies must therefore be avoided so that socialism might be realized simultaneously with national liberation.[2]

The Draft Program of Action formulated by the Communist Party of India in 1930 followed the orthodox formula and ignored the realities of the Indian scene. It advocated agrarian revolution and militant unionism, the cancellation of debts, confiscation of British property, abolition of the native states, and the expropriation of the lands of landlords, princes, churches, moneylenders, and government. Eradication of the caste system was also to be accompanied by the violent overthrow of British rule. The Congress Party was described as an organization of capitalists opposed to the interests of the Indian masses.[3] Attempts to implement this program alienated Indian nationalist leaders and provoked the government to outlaw the party from 1934 until 1942.

After 1935 the Comintern authorized a united front program against the British, which nationalists at first welcomed as a belated Communist recognition of nationalist objectives. The arrangement was exploited, however, to afford opportunity for outlawed Communist elements to infiltrate Congress-Socialist ranks as a means of promoting Soviet objectives. By 1939 genuinely nationalist leaders in the Socialist camp, such as Jai Prakash Narain, repudiated Communist connections and denounced the party as the dishonest and unscrupulous agent of a foreign power.[4]

Estrangement between Communists and Congress Party became complete after 1942 when, on orders from Moscow, the Communists reversed their earlier denunciations of the "imperialistic war" and began collaborating with the British in its prosecution in opposition to the Congress Party's "Quit India" demand. Communists opposed the agents of Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian National Army, discouraged industrial strikes, promoted agricultural production, and participated in air-raid precautions, loan drives, and famine relief. In an excess of zeal some of them actually kept the police informed of undercover Congress Party activities. Belated Communist attempts to recover their standing by proposing mass mobilization to force Britain to transfer power to a provisional national government and by a campaign for the release of Congress leaders from jail were ineffective. As soon as Congress Party leaders were released from jail

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1. For a detailed study of this question see OIR 2681, "The Communist Party in India," August 1945, UNCLASSIFIED.
2. OIR-3489.1, September 3, 1946, "The USSR and the Colonial Problem, Part I - Africa," SECRET.
3. OIR-2681, "The Communist Party in India," pp. 67-73, August 1945, UNCLASSIFIED.
4. OIR-2681, op. cit., pp. 67-73.

in mid-1945 they denounced the Communists as betrayers of the national struggle for freedom who were no longer worthy of membership in the Congress Party.[1] India's nationalist groups all treated Communists as political untouchables.[2] Thus the CPI attempts since 1930 to follow Moscow's devious line has constituted a major liability for the party.

2. Character of the CPI. Since July 1942, when the CPI was reinstated as a legal organization, official party membership has increased from under 3,000 to perhaps 40-50,000.[3] The immediate objective does not appear to be a large membership but the development of organizational methods and a corps of disciplined workers who will follow unquestioningly the directions of the local CPI Politburo.[4] Candidates must prove their worth before being admitted to membership. Approximately 4,000 party workers are currently employed, most of them for 30-40 rupees per month. The bulk of the membership is drawn from worker and peasant groups.[5] The Party controls the All-India Students' Federation, currently holds 55 percent of the Working Committee membership of the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), and runs the All-India Kisan Sabha (peasants' union). Communists are also active in the Indian Peoples' Theatre Association and in other seemingly innocuous organizations.[6] The gains realized by the Communists during the war years, when Congress Party leaders were held in jail, are gradually disappearing, and now that leftist Congress Party competition for support of the masses has revived reports indicate that the party's growth is slowing up and that its influence is waning even among students and working-class groups.

The leadership of the CPI is entirely indigenous.[7] It is drawn in considerable measure from ultra-nationalist student groups that one observer described as undoubtedly sincere but usually ill-informed.

Aside from visits of a number of Indian Communists to Moscow and to other Soviet training centers apparently no direct personal contacts between the CPI and the Comintern are maintained. Most of the outside help and virtually all of the known outside direction (apart from radio transmissions) of the CPI program in India has come through the International Committee of the British Communist Party, of which R. Palme Dutt, an Anglo-Indian is chairman. The preparation in London of some Communist literature for distribution and sale in India has allegedly been paid for by Soviet funds but details are not known. British Communist connections are maintained by the personal visits of members, by direct mail, and by

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1. Ibid., pp. 27-29. P.C. Joshi's rejoinder to Congress charges may be found in a pamphlet entitled Congress and Communists.
2. D-1292, Calcutta, December 26, 1946.
3. D-939, New Delhi, February 5, 1947, SECRET. The party claimed 53,700 members in October 1946.
4. Soli Batliwala, Facts vs. Forgery. Traitorous Role Played by the Communist Party Exposed (Bombay, 1946).
5. OIR-2681, Communist Party in India, August 1945, pp. 1-5, UNCLASSIFIED.
6. Batliwala, op. cit.
7. D-674, Madras, October 28, 1946, RESTRICTED.

the transmission of funds through private bank accounts.[1] Poorly paid representatives of the Muslim Indian press are peculiarly susceptible to British Communist influence.[2]

The CPI is perennially hard up for funds to maintain its headquarters in Bombay, to keep its expensive presses operating, and to pay the salaries of its party workers. The Daily Worker of New York was reported at one time to have sent a monthly remittance of Rs. 750, and the Canadian Tribune Rs. 300.[3] The bulk of the party funds, so far as is known, comes from Indians of means, from trade union treasuries, and from numerous small contributions. Provincial committees are often assigned quotas to meet emergency needs.[4] The party permits itself no apparent deviation from established Marxian orthodoxy for colonial countries although detailed Soviet direction is not in evidence. In special situations such as the visit of the British Cabinet Mission and the Communist Party Empire Conferences CPI guidance has come through British channels.

B. Activities of the CPI

1. General Program. The domestic political demands of the CPI, as formulated in the spring of 1946 with the aid of Palme Dutt, were the immediate withdrawal of all British troops from India[5] and full adult suffrage in the election of a sovereign Constituent Assembly and in any plebiscites relating to the future affiliation of predominantly Muslim areas and of the Indian states.[6] The Communist program appeared to be anti-imperialistic, ultra-democratic, and designed to by-pass both religious strife and the sovereign claims of the princes. Congress Party objectives were much the same except as modified in the interest of expediting the achievement of independence. Dutt's unpublicized decision ruled that the CPI must join any actual revolutionary movement, even if prematurely started, in order to take control of it eventually with possible aid from the USSR.[7]

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1. Statement by M. R. Masani, early in 1946.
2. D-881, New Delhi, December 16, 1946, SECRET, Communist Tendencies of the Muslim Press.
3. D-939, New Delhi, February 5, 1947, SECRET.
4. People's Age, March 9, 1947.
5. Much is made of Britain's intention to maintain a military foothold on the strategic North West Frontier. The Communist press not only attacks General Auchinleck's Indianization program but hails such events as the anniversary of the Indian Navy Mutiny. People's Age, November 24, 1946 and February 23, 1947. Indian Army personnel returning from leave have been harassed by Communists in Trichinopoly, Coimbatore, and Malabar, where strikes were in progress. India Command, Monthly Intelligence Summary, No. 19, December 2, 1946, and No. 21, February 1, 1947.
6. D-724, Calcutta, May 6, 1946, CONFIDENTIAL. The CPI declared that if the people of a given area should vote to remain outside no sector would be forced to become a part of unified India unless separation was geographically and economically impracticable.
7. D-1138, Calcutta, October 8, 1946.

A more recent statement of Communist demands includes the withdrawal of Indian troops from abroad, nationalization of British economic holdings in India, cessation of police interference with workers' strikes or with peasants' actions against landlords, and credit assistance to the peasants. The CPI has proposed also the redrawing of India's provincial boundaries to establish seventeen linguistic and culturally homogenous areas each of which would be permitted to choose whether or not it would affiliate with an Indian Union.[1] These suggestions have been accompanied by the remarkable proposal that the government itself should encourage popular uprisings against British rule to serve as a solvent of India's political and religious differences.[2]

2. CPI Sensitivity to Moscow Radio Propaganda. The propaganda on international questions found in the columns of the People's Age agrees in all particulars with the interpretations given out by the Moscow radio. Both attack Anglo-American capitalist-imperialism,[3] and present stereotyped apologies for the policies of the USSR in Eastern Europe and the Near and Middle East.[4] They depict Communist parties throughout the world as champions of peace and the rights of the common man.[5] They also agree in attacking the sincerity of the Cabinet Mission Plan and blame the British for deliberately provoking communal dissension, for supporting the native princes, and for planning to perpetuate foreign military control in India.[6]

The People's Age and the Moscow radio have differed somewhat in their respective attitudes toward India's major parties and the Interim Government. Since October 1946 Moscow has made a number of favorable comments concerning Pandit Nehru's government and has said little in criticism of either the Congress Party or the Muslim League. This policy accords with the USSR's bid for international support of India's Interim Government. The Soviet intention to support the Interim Government was conveyed to India in October through Palme Dutt in London; the policy has been highly unpopular in CPI circles, especially in Bengal.[7]

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1. People's Age, December 15, 1946.
2. People's Age, December 9, 1946. Communist spokesmen declare that communal rioters, both Muslim and Hindu, will eventually discover that they have been betrayed by their leaders, and will unite in an inevitable revolutionary upheaval. See ONI, 197-46, November 12, 1946, CONFIDENTIAL.
3. People's Age, March 2, 1947.
4. Ibid., October 20, 1946. Both assert that Turkey served as a Nazi outpost during the war and allege that Britain intends to use it again. See T-100, New Delhi, February 14, 1947, SECRET.
5. Ibid., December 22, 1946. The newspaper characterized the suppression of Tudeh and Democrat groups in Azerbaijan as a victory for reaction supported by American influence.
6. Ibid., November 24, 1946. Evidence of British intentions to remain in military control of the North West Frontier is cited.
7. D-1292, Calcutta, December 26, 1946. The CPI is inclined to do its own thinking in regard to India's internal political situation, according to D-939, New Delhi, February 5, 1947, SECRET.

The People's Age, on the other hand, has consistently and vigorously attacked both major parties for abetting the British conspiracy to promote communal rioting, for opposing strikes by workers and peasants, for betraying the inhabitants of the Indian states out of concern for the favor of princes, and for suppressing the working-class (i.e. Communist) movement.[1] The difference is doubtless one of immediate tactics rather than of long-range strategy, and yet a contradiction is evident. CPI efforts to instigate social revolution against nationalist governments within India cannot in the long run contribute to better relations between India and the Soviet Union. Communist-fomented disturbances that have no relevance to the liberation of India from British rule serve only to embarrass India's provincial governments and anger nationalist leadership.

An attempt was made at the February 1947 session of the Empire Communist Party Conference at London to explain away the seeming divergence of policy being followed by Moscow and the CPI with respect to India. Palme Dutt's pronouncement, the most important of the Conference, declared that in the precarious world balance between the forces of capitalist-imperialist warmongers on the one hand and "democratic" socialism on the other eventual alignment of the vast populations of India and China could play the decisive role. Real independence in the near future for colonial India and for semi-colonial China would, he argued, bring an enormous accession of strength to the progressive camp and would go far to weaken Britain's imperialist position, already overstrained in terms of manpower and resources. In utilizing the UN as a principal weapon to thwart the designs of the capitalists-imperialists the Soviet Union needed India's support.[2] Hence the CPI should endeavor to take full advantage of the upsurge of political consciousness among India's masses to effect a speedy overthrow of British rule. The statement assumes somewhat gratuitously that a free India would automatically align herself with the Slavic power bloc and that continued revolutionary agitation by the CPI will contribute to that end.

The normal tactics of the CPI have been to take advantage of local grievances to arouse mass protest and then if possible to provoke police authorities to acts of violent repression. Communist agitators either seek martyrdom or run away, seldom attempting to arrive at any compromise settlement.[3] Periodic mass demonstrations to attract public attention are part of the technique. They attempt also to influence Congress Socialists to repudiate the government's cautious policies and to "join hands with the Communists ... for the inevitable fight against imperialism and its Princely stooges."[4] Communist workers everywhere have sought to persuade the working classes, with whom they persistently identify themselves, that the only hope of relief lies in a violent "upsurge" of India's masses.[5]

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1. A-51, Bombay, February 20, 1947, UNCLASSIFIED.
2. D-4173, London, March 7, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL, enclosure No. 2: Communist Parties of the Empire and the Fight for Peace and Democracy.
3. D-673, Madras, October 23, 1946, RESTRICTED.
4. People's Age, March 16, 1947.
5. The Hindu, September 25, 1946; People's Age, June 16, 1946, January 19, 1947.

The Communist Party claims full responsibility for the unprecedented strike wave of 1946-47, which extended to every field of India's industry and to many areas of government employ.[1] Many of the strikes are clearly attributable to the prevailing disparity between wage and price increases and they would have occurred without Communist instigation. Police repression has been exploited to provoke workers' defiance of both owners and police.[2] Communist agitators were particularly active in the South India Railway strike, in trouble connected with the Cawnpore mills, the Port Trust, Tramways, manufacturing and engineering firms in Calcutta, and in numerous other instances in Bombay and Madras Presidencies, Travancore, and Malabar.[3]

3. The situations in Madras and Bengal. The total impact of the Communist program is relatively insignificant considering the enormous size of India, but the CPI has made a sufficient nuisance of itself to have invited repressive measures by provincial governments. Communists were permitted more scope in Madras and Bengal than elsewhere. Agitators in Madras Presidency took full advantage up to the end of 1946 of the reluctance of the Congress Party government to interfere with their disruptive efforts. The ineptitude of the well-intentioned but weak government of Prime Minister Prakasam afforded opportunity for attacks from both Left and Right. Linguistic and religious discontent were exploited to foment unrest in Malabar and Tamilnad areas.[4] Repressive measures undertaken by the Madras government in January 1947 were countered by popular defiance and violence.[5]

In Bengal strikes have plagued Calcutta's transportation and portions of her major industries for many months.[6] Communists reversed their wartime opposition to the Indian National Army and openly sought, albeit with little success, to enlist support from members of Subhas Chandra Bose's prewar Forward Bloc.[7] The CPI continues to be

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1. Notably the railway, postal, and telegraph workers. A police strike was instigated by CPI in Bihar (Hindustan Times, March 30, 1947). Clerks of thirty-four Central Government offices in Calcutta struck in January 1947.

2. As for example in the Amalner shooting incident in Bombay Presidency on August 27, 1946. See the Hindu, December 25, 1946.

3. People's Age, November 10, 1946, January 5, 19, and March 16, 1947. Twenty-eight strikes were listed as being in progress during October 15 to 31, 1946.

4. D-727, Madras, February 1, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL. Communists claimed in 1945, quite extravagantly, a party membership of 10,000 in a 20 million population of Andhra Desa (Madras); the party claimed control over 40,000 Trade Unionists, 170,000 Ryots Association members, 30,000 agricultural coolies, 20,000 youth, 11,000 students, and 15,000 women followers.

5. Ibid., Hindu, December 16, 1946. The Communist Daily of Calicut urged the Moplah Muslims of Malabar to rebel.

6. A report as of March 27, listed 65,000 workers of 20 firms on strike with six other strikes pending involving 53,000 workers. People's Age, April 6, 1947.

7. D-1138, Calcutta, October 8, 1946; T-25, Calcutta, February 2, 1947, RESTRICTED. Sarat Chandra Bose, heir to his brother's Forward Bloc, has used the Communist invitation in an apparent effort to blackmail the Congress Party.

the largest single element in the Bengal Provincial Trade Union Congress with its 147 unions and 253,000 members, but it lost ground to rivals during the latter half of 1946.[1]

The CPI supported the Muslim League's Direct Action Day of August 16, 1946 in Calcutta in the hope that Muslim discontent could be turned against the British and that the Cabinet Mission Plan could thereby be wrecked. The Communist-controlled Tramway Workers' Union was called out on strike on the same day to add force to the protest. The plan backfired when religious fanaticism overrode both anti-British feeling and ideologies, and Communist Hindu and Communist Muslim fought each other. The Congress groups were infuriated over CPI support of the Muslims. On orders from London Communist tactics were changed and thereafter Britain was accused of inflaming communal feeling as a means of preventing the emergence of an anti-imperialist front. This proved, however, to be a singularly ineffective means of rehabilitating the local standing of the CPI.

By the end of 1946 the Bengal branch of the CPI, traditionally the strongest in India, numbered 8,500 members and employed only 250 full-time workers as compared with 500 early in the year. Serious disagreements obtained with regard to both policies and tactics, all of which were complicated by financial difficulties. The monthly income of Rs. 8,000 was not sufficient to maintain an active program, to cover the deficit of the local Communist paper (Sivadhinata), and to retire the large debt incurred in the 1946 spring elections.[2]

4. The Communist Position in the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC). Since 1944 Communists have been an important element in the most important labor group in India, the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC). S. A. Dange, President of the AITUC since 1945, attended the Constituent Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Paris in October 1945. Communists held approximately half of the places in the General Council of the AITUC in 1945 and 75 percent of them in 1946. The Indian Federation of Labor, a more conservative organization initiated during the war by M.N. Roy and Jamnadas Mehta, was thoroughly discredited when it became known that the leaders had accepted government subsidies as the price of their collaboration[3] in prosecuting the war against Japan.

The AITUC, theoretically a labor-welfare body in which political resolutions required a three-fourths vote of the annual convention for approval, has been a storm center of Congress-Communist rivalry. Pro-Congress resolutions predominated until 1944. The 1947 sessions held on February 17 and 18 were a trifle less acrimonious than previous ones because of the willingness of the Communists to make concessions in the matter of leadership. The Communist President, S. A. Dange, was reelected and the party retained 55 percent of the seats in the General Council, but the other four office bearers, including the key post of General Secretary, were chosen from non-Communist candidates.[4]

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1. D-1292, Calcutta, December 26, 1946.
2. Ibid.
3. D-939, New Delhi, February 5, 1947, SECRET; OIR 2681, pp. 45-51, UNCLASSIFIED.
4. People's Age, March 9, 1947; A-86, Bombay, March 12, 1947, UNCLASSIFIED.

Although the AITUC declared itself to be in favor of a socialist state, with industry nationalized, feudal holdovers abolished, and political power exercised by the producing masses, significant concessions were made to Congress Socialist opinion. Instead of urging a popular "upsurge" on the Communist model the AITUC recognized that the immediate objectives before the country were the attainment of national freedom and the formulation of a democratic constitution.[1]

Although the trade union movement itself is growing,[2] the measure of CPI dominance over it is declining. The Congress Socialists have recently taken over control of the United Provinces TUC and have formed a railwayman's union almost equal in strength to the CPI bloc.[3] Socialist control of the AITUC probably awaits only the maturity of their present program of renewed activity.[4]

5. The Kisan Sabha Program. The All-Indian Kisan Sabha (peasants' organization) was founded in 1936 by the Congress Socialist Party as an amalgamation of several provincial peasant organizations, and included Communists, Forward Bloc members, and non-party revolutionaries. The AIKS began to disintegrate around 1940, and its ruin was virtually completed when Congress and Forward Bloc leaders were jailed in 1942. By 1945 Communists had consolidated their control of the remains of the Kisan Sabha in most of the provinces. Several provincial Kisan Sabhas, notably in Bihar and the United Provinces, withdrew from the AIKS and continued to function independently under non-Communist control. The AIKS in 1945 claimed that they commanded a following of 800,000 of whom 30,000 were CPI members.[5]

Since the end of the war Communist Kisan Sabha agitators acting as provocateurs among restive peasant groups have had the field largely to themselves; non-Communist peasant groups have not been active. The Congress Socialists have developed on paper a comprehensive program for rural improvement, partly governmental, partly

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1. People's Age, March 2, 1947.
2. People's Age, March 9, 1947. Unions affiliated with the AITUC allegedly increased from 400 to 600 and membership from 480,000-730,000 since 1945.
3. D-939, New Delhi, February 5, 1947, SECRET.
4. The alleged reason for projecting in May 1947 the All-India National Trade Union Congress, backed by Sardar Patel and Gulzarilal Nanda (Bombay's Minister of Labor, long associated with Gandhi's Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association), was to break away from the Communist-dominated AITUC, (New York Times, May 4, 1947). Actually, conservative Congress groups are probably taking advantage of the unpopularity of the Communists to promote a labor organization more to their liking rather than to oust the Communists in favor of Socialist control of the AITUC.
5. OIR-FM-1323, Political Influence on the Indian Peasant Movement, New Delhi, February 15, 1946, SECRET; OIR-2681, op.cit., August 1945, UNCLASSIFIED, pp. 51-58.

self-help, but they lack both the organization and the funds to start organizing the peasants for its realization. Meanwhile, provincial Congress governments, although they are in the process of drafting detailed programs for land reform, have been unable effectively to control food prices and distribution and have been obliged to suppress peasant lawlessness.[1] Communist-inspired peasant movements in Bengal, and to a minor degree in Bihar and the United Provinces, have seized hoarded food and demanded that one-third instead of the customary one-half of the crop be accepted as rent. Peasant evictions were resisted at Thana in Bombay, at Amritsar in the Punjab, in parts of Madras Presidency, and in Hyderabad.[2] Peasants in Malabar under CPI leadership demanded that rents be made payable not in kind but in cash at controlled-produce prices, the grain itself going to the government rather than to the landlord's granaries.[3] The People's Age trumpeted: "Today we battle for the harvest; tomorrow we battle for the land!"[4]

6. CPI Work Among Students. The Communist-dominated All-India Students' Federation, organized with Muslim support during the war, is regarded as the least successful of the numerous organizations sponsored by the party,[5] but it has nevertheless been an important factor in fomenting student demonstrations and strikes in Calcutta, Lucknow, Madras, and elsewhere.[6] In Bengal, the only province for which detailed information is available, the Provincial Student Federation lost ground in late 1946 because of CPI participation in the August "Direct Action Day" and because of the Federation's condemnation of Congress leaders for entering the Interim Government in

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1. D-939, New Delhi, February 5, 1947, SECRET.
2. People's Age, December 15, 29, 1946; Hindustan Times, December 16, 1946.
3. People's Age, December 29, 1946.
4. Ibid., January 19, 1947. The program formulated by the AIKS Council at Calcutta in November 1946 demanded immediate outlawing of the ejection of tenants, halting of transactions in land, and reduction of rents to either one-fourth of the gross produce or double the land revenue, whichever was less. The long-term land program under State ownership would guarantee for both landlords and tenants maximum holdings of twenty-five acres each for self-cultivation, and state aid up to Rs. 500 per year for landlords who lost their means of subsistence by reason of the abolition of landlordism. Renting of land would be prohibited and transfers of land would be effected only through state agencies. A graduated income tax with a tax free minimum would replace land taxation. See People's Age, December 15, 1947.
5. D-939, New Delhi, February 5, 1947, SECRET.
6. Communist student leaders in Calcutta ignored pro-Vietnam student demonstrations of January 21 and 23, 1947 until police interference afforded them an opportunity to provoke more trouble. D-1374, Calcutta, January 28, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL. When 200 unruly Lucknow students were arrested by the local Congress authorities in early November 1946 a Communist-organized procession proceeded to the district jail and demanded their release. Hindustan Times, November 4, 1946. Agitators at Musulipatam and Guntur Colleges in Madras closed both schools because a few students had been expelled for not attending classes. D-674, Madras, October 28, 1946, RESTRICTED.

September 1946. The Congress-sponsored All-India Students' Conference far outnumbered the Provincial Student Federation in Bengal.[1]

The tenth annual meeting of the All-India Students' Federation at Delhi on January 4, 1947 elicited little public support when, in orthodox CPI fashion, it urged the Interim Government to aid in staging a united final struggle to overthrow British imperialism in India and to stop all police and military interference against the peoples' struggles.[2] The Soviet delegate on the visiting Youth Commission criticized the youth program in India for lack of interest among working and peasant classes.[3]

7. The Communist Program in the Princely States. In denouncing the Indian princes as stooges of British imperialism and strongholds of reaction and oppression[4] the Communists were no more extreme than spokesmen for the Congress-sponsored States Peoples' Conference (of which Pandit Nehru himself until very recently was president). Congress Party agitation for responsible governments within the States has actually influenced princes in the past to play off Communist groups against the stronger Congress influence.[5] As part of Congress Party efforts to achieve a free and unified India without bloodshed under the Cabinet Mission Plan, President Nehru has restrained the States Peoples' Conference so that the princes would not be alienated.[6] The CPI has taken advantage of resulting Congress inactivity to precipitate trouble on several notable occasions.

Communist-Congress policy differences in regard to the States are illustrated in Hyderabad, where the Nizam selected as Prime Minister a prominent nationalist Muslim, Sir Mirza Ismail, to effect proposed constitutional reforms that fell far short of responsible government. M.K. Gandhi urged Sir Mirza privately but without effect to scrap the reforms, or at least to seek the endorsement of the States Peoples' Conference before proceeding with them.[7] Pandit Nehru counselled the officers of the State Congress of Hyderabad to reject the reforms, but forbade resort to Satyagraha (passive resistance) or to picketing which would embarrass Sir Mirza and alienate the sympathies of the Nizam.[8] CPI agents in contrast instigated in November 1946 mass attacks on landlords and officials in the Nalgonda District of

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1. D-1138 and D-1292, Calcutta, October 8 and December 26, 1946.
2. Dawn, January 5, 1947.
3. D-1041, New Delhi, April 9, 1947, UNCLASSIFIED.
4. People's Age, October 20 and December 8, 1946.
5. D-727, Madras, February 1, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL. Notably in Travancore.
6. People's Age, May 4, 1947.
7. Gandhi to Sir Mirza Ismail, August 11 and September 9, 1946, quoted in The Modern Review, LXXXI, No. 1, January 1947, p. 10.
8. Ibid. Nehru wrote to the Hyderabad State Congress President on September 24, 1946: "The exigencies of the situation prevailing in the country require that you . . . weigh the issues involved . . . from the All-India point of view because its repercussions will . . . have a wider range."

Hyderabad where a defective and corrupt system of grain procurement provided a local grievance.

A States Peoples' Conference investigator reported that police killed 9 or 10 persons and arrested 400 villagers. Six CPI agents were captured while some 300 others allegedly absconded. The report criticized Communist tactics and denied the more lurid types of CPI propaganda.[1] The Nizam's government outlawed the CPI in December 1946,[2] and as late as April 1947 the police in Nalgonda District clashed again with a "Communist" peasant mob of six or eight hundred who were attempting to effect the release of arrested villagers and killed seven.[3]

In Travancore, where militant elements of the States Congress Party were preparing to resist the imposition of a new "American type" of constitution (with an independent but non-elective executive), the government for a time encouraged Communist activity as a counter-irritant to Congress Party pressure. When Communist-inspired unrest developed in mid-October over food shortages in two important trade unions affiliated with the AITUC,[4] the government prohibited strikes and subversive activities.[5] Following the outlawry of the CPI on October 19 and the arrest of 150 union and Communist leaders, a general strike occurred on October 22, involving some 80,000 workers. The military put it down with machine-guns after three days of carnage. The government admitted 190 strikers killed (the number was probably much larger) and no estimate was made of the wounded.[6] Subsequent demonstrations on November 7 provoked additional military repression in the course of which thousands of refugees fled to neighboring Cochin. The total dead were conservatively estimated at 300.[7]

Local Congress Party spokesmen denounced the repressive measures of the Government, but also denounced the provocation of extremist elements bent on inciting violence. The Communists replied that the Congress had betrayed the struggle in Travancore which Congress agents had begun.[8]

Outside of Hyderabad and Travancore the Communists have been obliged for the most part to limit their States program to press attacks

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1. Hindu, December 16 and 22, 1946, and January 3, 1947.
2. Ibid., December 10, 1946.
3. Hindustan Times, April 9, 1947.
4. Bombay Chronicle, November 18, 1946.
5. The Bombay Chronicle, November 18, 1946, commented on the arrest of prominent literary figures in Travancore.
6. D-676, Madras, October 29, 1946, UNCLASSIFIED; D-685, Madras, December 2, 1946, RESTRICTED; D-696, Madras, December 10, 1946, RESTRICTED; People's Age, November 10, 1946.
7. Bombay Chronicle, November 18, 1946.
8. People's Age, October 27, 1946, November 10, December 15, 1946. The Congress Socialist paper Janata blamed the CPI for inciting violence in Travancore, describing it not as an attack on autocracy but as a piece of Communist deviltry.

on the Congress Party's compromise agreement with the princes covering their representation in the Constituent Assembly. They have urged Congress Socialists in particular to repudiate Pandit Nehru's cautious leadership of the States Peoples' Conference.[1] These efforts have been to no avail. The People's Age continues to emphasize alleged intentions of London to exploit Britain's favorable position in the reactionary states to perpetuate their military hold on India.[2]

C. Reaction of Indian Groups to the CPI Program

1. Provincial Governmental Policies. Governmental suppression was apparently expected by those who deliberately planned the provocative Communist program. As early as September 1946 P.C. Joshi, the party Secretary, ordered all records and addresses destroyed and began preparing underground apparatus. Personnel were enlisted for it, including some ex-terrorists and ex-convicts. A courier system was set up for the distribution of important Party communications.[3] More recently the party has protected its publishing houses against possible confiscation by transforming them into limited concerns with a majority of shares held by non-party members.[4]

The expected repression began in September when Bengali police raided CPI properties in Calcutta.[5] In October Prime Minister T. Prakasam of Madras began suppressing CPI disturbers of the peace and prosecuting individuals for subversive offenses;[6] he later intensified the program. In late December prominent Communists were arrested in Nagpur, (CP).[7] About the same time the Bombay government undertook emergency measures against Communists for endangering the lives of peaceful and law-abiding citizens.[8] Press criticism attacked conservative do-nothing governments as well as the Communists.[9]

On January 14, 1947 police officers of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) with the cooperation of provincial police raided simultaneously the Communist offices in nine or ten urban centers

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1. People's Age, March 16, May 4, 1947.
2. Ibid., January 12, 1947. The Moscow radio follows the same theme.
3. D-1292, Calcutta, December 26, 1946.
4. D-939, New Delhi, February 5, 1947, SECRET.
5. Hindu, September 18, 1946.
6. Hindustan Times, April 13, 1947, alleges violation of the Indian Official Secret Act.
7. Hindu, December 24, 1946.
8. Hindustan Times, December 26, 1946. Prime Minister Kher of Bombay denounced the recently developed interest of the CPI in the distress of exploited areas and said that granted time the Congress Party would redeem its promises.
9. A Congress spokesman in the Bombay Chronicle of January 5, 1947 took the government to task for not getting at the causes of discontent of the World timbercutters in Thana district which the CPI had mobilized. The press criticized government lethargy in relieving acknowledged distress as well as the systematically opportunistic and harmful policies of the CPI.

including Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, Allahabad, Lucknow, and Lahore. The office and the press of the People's Age in Bombay were ransacked as well as the homes of Communist officials. CPI-controlled unions, All-India Student Federations, Kisan Sabhas, and even the quarters of the Congress-sponsored Friends of the Soviet Union were raided.[1] The ostensible aim was to discover information about the leakage of an Army Headquarters top secret document which the People's Age had printed in May and June of 1946. The more immediate aim was to embarrass the party by seizing valuable records and by dramatizing the Central Government's opposition to Communist tactics. Prime Minister Kher of Bombay apparently was one of the chief instigators of the raid, and Sardar Patel, Home Member of the Interim Government, sanctioned the action, which had long been planned by the CID.[2] Pandit Nehru declared that he had not been consulted.[3] Sir Norman P. A. Smith, British head of the CID, and Home Minister Patel both advocated the jailing of all CPI agitators who embarrassed the government.[4]

The raids uncovered little incriminating evidence, as a number of the CPI headquarters had apparently been forewarned.[5] The editors of People's Age were arrested, as well as several CPI leaders in Calcutta, but the police for the most part seized only routine records and printed materials.[6] The Central Government's action encouraged provincial authorities in Bombay, Madras, Bengal, Assam, Orissa, and the United Provinces to intensify their anti-Communist measures.[7] A subsequent raid of CPI headquarters in Bombay took place on April 15, 1947.[8]

The Indian press reacted negatively to the CID-sponsored anti-Communist raids on January 14 on the ground that the Interim Government was acquiescing in the British methods of police intimidation that had long infringed the rights of the people.[9] Editors demanded that the police be relegated to their proper position as servants and not masters of the Government.[10] Dawn called for interim relief measures to stem the rising tide of strikes and a long-term plan for solving the economic problems of the country instead of waging a vendetta against the Communists.[11]

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1. Dawn, January 15, 1947.
2. D-330, Bombay, January 16, 1947, RESTRICTED. The Home Member, Sardar Patel, defended his role in the situation on the ground that he had only consented that the CID should afford assistance to provincial police agencies in the normal discharge of their duties. GOI Information Services No. 3323, February 6, 1947.
3. T-54, New Delhi, January 23, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL.
4. D-939, New Delhi, February 5, 1947, SECRET.
5. D-1353, Calcutta, January 16, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL.
6. Dawn, January 15, 1947.
7. D-3323, Bombay, February 3, 1947, RESTRICTED; People's Age, March 2, 9, January 19, 1947; Hindustan Times, March 13, 1947.
8. D-126, Bombay, April 18, 1947, UNCLASSIFIED.
9. D-3312, Bombay, January 24, 1947, RESTRICTED.
10. GOI Information Services, January 21, 1947.
11. Dawn, January 16, 1947.

The People's Age declared that panic-stricken Congress leaders had decided to lock up all Communists before the collapse of the Cabinet Mission Plan precipitated the general revolutionary struggle organized by the CPI. The People's Age subsequently repeated enthusiastically the Moscow theme that the British had plotted the anti-Communist raids as a means of discrediting Pandit Nehru's government in the eyes of the people.[1]

An American observer estimated that Congress would be gratified over the temporary clipping of Communist wings, but that the trouble would continue as long as large masses of underfed, overworked labor in India provided a perfect hothouse where the seed of Communism could germinate.[2]

2. Congress Views on the Communists. The attitudes of leaders of the Congress Party toward the CPI varies considerably. Pandit Nehru, although deploring misguided Communist activity in the labor field, is not lacking in sympathy for certain Communist objectives and has expressed the conviction that India's basic troubles are economic and must be attacked at the source.[3] M. K. Gandhi declared that Communist actions sustained the charge that they made no distinction between fair and foul, truth or falsehood; that they seemed to regard the USSR as their spiritual home; and that they took their instructions from Moscow. He did not challenge the sincerity of CPI concern for social grievances, but refused to countenance their dependence on an outside power.[4] A more conservative view, that of Prime Minister Kher of Bombay, made little distinction between Communists and Congress Socialists except that the latter were not hostile to the Congress Governments as was the CPI. Kher was apparently more angry with the mill owners than with either radical group, however, because unscrupulous employers were embarrassing the government by playing off the CPI (by bribery or other favors) against Congress worker groups, whose just demands they refuse to meet.[5] Sardar Patel, Home Minister, has accused Communists of deliberately endeavoring to embarrass the Congress Party, to promote violence and disruption of industry, and to throw the country into confusion. He recently urged labor groups to abandon the Communist-led AITUC in favor of his newly proposed National Trade Union Congress.[6] Above all, he pled for Congressmen to sink their differences and close their ranks in this most critical period of India's history.[7] A writer in the Indian Review commented by way of understatement that "resort to direct action which worsens the already deplorable condition of the general public is . . . not . . . a patriotic service."[8]

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1. People's Age, January 19, 26, March 2, 1947.
2. CDA-11, MA New Delhi, January 29, 1947, SECRET.
3. D-1296, Calcutta, December 30, 1946.
4. The Indian Review, vol. 47, No. 11 (November, 1946), p. 611.
5. D-3343, Bombay, February 13, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL.
6. Hindu, December 4, 1946.
7. Hindustan Times, April 15, 1947.
8. Indian Review, XLVII, No. 12 (December 1946).

The editor of the Eastern Economist has deplored the Communists' "technique of confusion," but added that it did not help to trace the source of such tactics to Marxian philosophy or Soviet politics, as any situation where the workers regarded employers as exploiters and employers viewed workers as human tools and instruments for short-term profit ensured the moral triumph of the Marxism. He criticized the lack of correspondence between the high principles and amorphorus policies of the Congress Party and concluded that if employers would make minor concessions sufficient to keep labor contented no cause would be given for social upheaval and industrial output would be increased.[1]

3. Congress-Socialist Attitude toward the CPI. The attitude of the Congress Socialist Party leaders is in some respects more uncompromising than that of conservative Congress spokesmen in condemning the Indian Communists. Jai Prakash Narain, Socialist leader, refuses to countenance any cooperation with the CPI because of its demonstrated policy of infiltrating Socialist ranks for ulterior ends, its subservience to Moscow, and the complete denial of true freedom in the USSR's one-party system.[2] The following statement by Narain is characteristic:

> "Communists openly advocate general strikes, not in the interests of the workers themselves, but in their own interests. The Communist aim [is] to discredit the Congress and . . . to strengthen their hold by posing as champions of the workers. . . . The Communists are agents of a foreign power and as such we will have no truck with them, howsoever friendly be the country whose agents they are."[3]

The hostile feeling of the Socialists toward the CPI is attributable in large measure to the fact that the two compete on much the same political level, competing with each other in demonstrating their concern for the welfare of the workers and peasants. The superior popular standing that Socialist leaders enjoy, growing out of their long and honorable affiliation with the nationalist movement and their work among laboring groups, is currently vulnerable to attack from the more active Communists. The latter suffer no inhibitions arising from concern for maintaining Indian unity territorially and politically during the critical days of transition and they castigate the Socialists for talking of revolution while refusing to take part in the "revolution in being" which the CPI is promoting.

Although Socialist leaders distrust British intentions almost as much as do the Communists and are becoming increasingly restive under

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1. "Workmen's Attitudes," Eastern Economist, VII, No. 11 (September 13, 1946), pp. 427-29.
2. People's Age, June 16, 1946; Janata, July 28, 1946.
3. Free Press Journal, March 15, 1947. On another occasion, Narain claimed that the CPI supported Pakistan just to spite the Congress and that it delighted in fomenting trouble for the fun of mischief and for the purpose of thriving in a diseased body politic. CIG SO-4797, "Jai Prakash Narain Speaks", March 9, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL.

Congress Party restraints, they are nevertheless committed to following democratic processes and have agreed not to foment violence as long as the Interim Government remains in power.[1] Socialists appear confident that once the critical period is past they can attract a mass following in India in competition with both the CPI and the rightwing Congress Party.

4. Muslim League Relations with the Communists

a. Basis of their rapprochement. A tentative rapprochement between the Muslim League and the CPI developed during the war partly on the basis of the declared acceptance of Communist principles by India's Muslims and partly on alleged Communist support of Pakistan. India's Muslims are fond of saying that Islam is a communistic religion of the common man within which all men are brothers. M.A. Jinnah, president of the League, has also explained that the objectionable atheistic theories of Marxism are unrelated to the "practical and burning urge to break existing economic shackles for the benefit of the common man." He has advocated utilizing in India the best aspects of the Soviet system and has attributed to blinded Anglo-American propaganda the "bogey that the USSR has no good will and M. Stalin and his friends are intrinsically symbols of wickedness."[2] An abortive proposal of the Sind Provincial Muslim League in September 1946 that a Muslim delegation seek Soviet support for Pakistan was explained as growing out of the "increasingly socialistic outlook on the part of Indian Muslims."[3]

This alleged ideological affinity between Muslims and Communists was reinforced by the wartime interpretation of a long-established Communist proposal (formulated in 1930 and elaborated in 1942) that autonomous rule be accorded to Indian "nationalities" living in a contiguous area and enjoying common economic and historical traditions, language, culture, and psychology as anticipating the plan for Pakistan. Some sixteen or seventeen such nationalities were contemplated in the Communist scheme.[4] In August 1944, P.C. Joshi, CPI secretary, said explicitly that the party would be willing to concede the Muslim-League conception of Pakistan as a means of securing India's independence. The theory behind the Communist proposal was that the concession was needed to eliminate Muslim fears of Hindu domination, so that all of India could unite on non-religious issues to overthrow British rule.[5] The estrangement between the Congress Party and the CPI after 1945 tended to intensify the none-too-successful efforts of Communists to infiltrate the Muslim League.[6]

b. Differences over religious partisanship. The hollowness of alleged Communist cooperation with the Muslim League was revealed to some extent in the Direct Action Day fiasco of August 1946 in Calcutta.

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1. D-1014, New Delhi, March 25, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL.
2. R-215, New Delhi, November 20, 1946, RESTRICTED.
3. Dawn, September 10 and 14, 1946.
4. The Daily Worker (N.Y.), April 25, 1946. Article by R. Palme Dutt from New Delhi dated April 17, 1946.
5. OIR-2681, pp. 33-43.
6. D-1138, Calcutta, October 8, 1946.

Communist leaders attempted unsuccessfully to canalize Muslim unrest against the British only to find that religious fanaticism overrode both political and ideological considerations.[1] Since that time the CPI has condemned all communal rioting and has decried religious partisanship, which is particularly in evidence within the Muslim League.[2] Both the Moscow radio and the People's Age pointed out that if religious strife continued a Pakistan-Hindustan division would bring no peace, as Hindustan would contain a Muslim population of 20 percent and Pakistan would be 40 percent Hindu.[3] Communist spokesmen accused religious partisans, mainly in the Muslim League, of playing Britain's game of divide and rule under the Cabinet Mission Plan, and criticized M. A. Jinnah for backing the most reactionary features of the Plan. The People's Age also condemned the role of the Muslim League in the Punjab riots of early 1947, and even exhorted the Congress Party to assist in enlisting Muslim masses in a joint struggle against the British and reactionary pro-imperialist Muslim leadership.[4] Within India the CPI bids openly for the support of discontented Muslim peasants against landlords, bureaucrats, and imperialists.[5]

c. Divergence over international issues. Almost complete divergence between the Soviet Union and Muslim League developed also on the international level. A principal factor was Jinnah's efforts to enlist active British support for Pakistan on the ground that failure to back the project would endanger Britain's position throughout the Muslim Near East: "The Russians," he declared, "have more than a spectator's interest in Indian affairs and they are not far from India, either. It's a serious menace."[6] The Moscow press denounced the slanderous attacks of Indians who spread the "absurd fiction about the seeming danger of interference by the Soviet Union."[7]

The Sind League's September 1946 proposal that the USSR intervene in behalf of Pakistan aroused a storm of protest in India's Urdu press[8] and President Jinnah denounced the idea as nonsense.[9] A

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1. D-1292, Calcutta, December 26, 1946.
2. People's Age, November 24, 1946.
3. All-India Radio, Analysis of Foreign Broadcasts, No. 267, December 18-24; People's Age, December 29, 1946.
4. People's Age, February 9, March 2, 1947; A-86, Bombay, March 12, 1947, UNCLASSIFIED. A Russian delegate to the Inter-Asian Relations Conference, in an unguarded moment, strongly denounced the Pakistan proposal as an absurdity, only to deny later the truth of the Indian press report. D-1037 New Delhi, April 8, 1947. CONFIDENTIAL.
5. An article by Dawn's special correspondent in Moscow dated March 3, 1947 emphasized the Soviet Union's friendship for India, but complained of a lack of Soviet interest in Pakistan and the lack of opportunity for Soviet Muslims to study Pakistan and to express their opinions in the press. He also cited the Soviet press attack on King Abdullah of Transjordan for premature recognition of Pakistan. Dawn, March 13, 1947.
6. New York Times, September 4, 1946.
7. The Hindu, September 17, 1946.
8. Roundup of Indian Press Comment, Vol. II, No. 75, September 14-17, 1946.
9. Dawn, September 12, 1946.

Moscow spokesman also repudiated the intervention suggestion, and added that India's Muslims would learn how, under Soviet rule, ancient Muslim peoples had prospered after throwing over the rule of reactionary landlords.[1] The People's Age subsequently attacked President Jinnah's proposal of an "Oriental Conference" and his allegations at Cairo that Hindu imperialism would threaten the Muslim Near East. The CPI paper insisted that both actions tended in reality to strengthen Britain's imperial hold in Southern Asia.[2]

The supposed international rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the Muslim League is clearly lacking in substance, whereas differences over landlordism, religious partisanship, and the liquidation of Britain's Middle Eastern position will tend to keep them apart.

5. M. N. Roy's Radical Democratic Party (RDP). The Radical Democratic Party headed by M. N. Roy,[3] an Indian member of the Comintern until he was expelled in 1929, advocates a program described as "communism heavily larded with humanism." In 1941 Roy and several British associates created the Indian Federation of Labor, rival organization of the AITUC. The RDP is unconnected with the Comintern but favors a close tie with the left-wing Labor Party in Britain. Its program resembles that of the CPI and in some respects that of the Congress Party in advocating radical economic changes, full adult suffrage for electing a constituent assembly, reconstitution of India's provinces on the basis of linguistic and cultural homogenity, and the right of a province to secede. Roy argues also for a world fraternity of free men realizable through collective endeavor and challenges Indian nationalism as a reactionary force. He would reconcile science with social organization, individuality with collective living, and formative ideas with economic determinism, and would give to human freedom both a moral and social content.[4] The People's Age condemns the RDP as pro-British and "reformist."[5]

Roy's appeal is to intellectual radicals who seek an alternative to a Soviet-directed communist program; he generates no mass enthusiasm to make up for his repudiation of nationalism and revolution. His plans to set up a network of People's Committees and to strengthen the Indian Federation of Labor are meeting with no success, therefore, and the party has no immediate prospect of attaining political importance.[6] Roy has lived too long out of India and has been too closely connected with British leftists to attract popular Indian confidence, even

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1. The Hindu, September 14, 17, 1946.
2. People's Age, January 3, 1947.
3. For details see OIR-3160, "The Radical Democratic Party of India," CONFIDENTIAL.
4. D-3336, Bombay, February 10, 1947, UNCLASSIFIED.
5. People's Age, January 5, 1947.
6. People's Age, January 5, 1947. The RDP numbers 150,000 members, three times the CPI, but it achieved negligible results in the 1946 elections and is declining in influence. Its acceptance of government subsidies during the war discredited it in nationalist eyes.

though his intellectual stature and sincerity of purpose may be conceded. Should a strong Communist ideological movement develop in India that would eventually repudiate Soviet connections the RDP might provide leadership for it, although the Congress Socialists would be in a far more advantageous position to capitalize on such a situation.[1]

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1. OIR-3160, op. cit.

IV. CONCLUSION

The widespread concern that prevails among Indians over the possibility of their becoming involved in a third World War supports the endeavors of Indian leaders to cultivate friendly relations with the USSR. Many Indians do not believe that the USSR has any intention of taking over poverty-stricken India,[1] and others assume that Anglo-American naval and air power would be committed in any case to halt any Soviet thrust in the direction of the Indian Ocean. Indians hope in the meantime to learn from the Soviet Union how to meet some of their pressing internal problems. Although Indians recognize Soviet influence behind the CPI they prefer not to allow the annoyance caused by Communist activity within India to divert their efforts to attain good relations with the USSR or to obtain aid.

India's concern for such friendly relations will probably diminish rather than grow. The common hostility that India and the USSR feel toward Britain will become much less compelling as India obtains her freedom and as her common interest with Britain in preventing Soviet expansion soutward is clarified. Whether India will be able to realize assistance from the Soviet Union in meeting her economic, social, and political problems remains to be seen. The USSR is "no bargain counter" and India's expectations of aid are highly inflated. Indian examination of Communism in action would reveal unfavorable aspects, including the high cost paid in terms of denial of personal and political freedom that Soviet propaganda has not publicized. The judgment of the India Office at London is that Soviet-Indian relations will not prosper and that Soviet influence in India will never be great.[2]

Soviet failure at the moment to make a great play for the domination of India can be attributed in part to the fact that the situation in India is not ripe for a Communist victory and partly to the fact that Soviet foreign policy counsels the enlistment of immediate Indian cooperation to weaken the Anglo-American world position and particularly Britain's influence throughout the Middle East.[3] Meanwhile, the People's Age can continue to advertise Soviet achievements and to defend Soviet foreign policy on all occasions, while the CPI can attract attention to itself by participating in the manifold situations in India where economic grievances obtain.

Soviet-Indian relations have been summarized as follows by an astute Indian observer:

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1. D-744, Madras, February 26, 1947, RESTRICTED.
2. T-2340, London, April 22, 1947, SECRET, by Sir Paul Patrick.
3. D-939, New Delhi, February 5, 1947, SECRET; T-2061, London, April 3, 1947, SECRET. Sir Norman Smith, CID head, affirms that India is "very low on Russia's list of priorities."

"The one country in the world which did not at first ... view the Indian Republic looming on the horizon as an unmixed blessing is Russia. Independence of India was coming too early for Russian plans of ascendancy in the East, and it was coming about in a way she perhaps never expected or desired. The Communist party in India is not yet strong. It has some nuisance value, but it is a discredited party expelled from the Indian National Congress and not much in favour with the Labour Unions in the country. It has not yet acquired a firm foothold on the soil of India. If Britain had not been prompt in her new impulse for nobler dealing with subject races or in her new enlightened strategy, she may have lost India to Russia, and all the East too as a sphere of friendly influence .... In spite of all the genuine admiration which India feels for the wonderful achievements of Soviet Russia, in spite of the fact that these will be a source of inspiration to India in her gigantic plans of national reconstruction, India will not be a camp follower, ready to veer as the wind from Moscow blows. It will allow no little islands of Russian influence to be built within her domain, to be used later as bases of assault on Indian culture and Indian way of life."[1]

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1. B. J. Vaswami, India and America, (Karachi, 1947) pp. 35-36.